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TRANSMITTING THE SAGE’S “HEART” (I): UNSEALING 
MORAL AUTONOMY — INTELLECTUAL INTUITION AND 
MOU ZONGSAN’S RECONSTRUCTION OF THE 
“CONTINUITY OF THE WAY” (DAOTONG)
Rafael Suter
Institute of Asian and Oriental Studies, University of Zurich
rafael.suter@aoi.uzh.ch
A major figure in New Confucianism,1 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995) is often 
considered one of the most important thinkers of twentieth-century China. His phi-
losophical work he labeled “moral metaphysics,” a caption inspired by Kant’s term 
“moral theology,” marking, at one and the same time, both an homage to and a dis-
approval of the German philosopher’s work. In Mou’s view, Kant, unable to come 
up with a convincing solution to the problem of integrating practical and theoreti-
cal philosophy, fails to provide a viable notion of the “Highest Good” (summum 
bonum).2 Mou’s own proposal to emend this alleged deficiency rests on two main 
pillars: the concept of intellectual intuition and the figure of a “perfect teaching” 
(yuanjiao 圓教).3 Whereas the former, at least in name, is Kantian itself, the latter is 
adopted from Buddhist scholastics.
The present essay argues that Mou’s choosing to place intellectual intuition at 
the heart of his philosophy has far-reaching consequences that prepare the ground 
for the eventual restoration of the authority of tradition: appealing to a personal ex-
perience of morality that purportedly evades expression by common propositional 
language, Mou presents intellectual intuition in a rhetoric of immediacy that he but-
tresses with the paradoxical architecture of the perfect teaching to invoke a discourse 
of indisputableness. He intends to talk about something that essentially transcends 
the realm of linguistic representation: the Way of the sage who in moral practice 
actually realizes the Good — not in his words but in his deeds. I intend to show that 
neither Mou’s attempt to cure Kantianism by admitting intellectual intuition nor his 
endeavor to explicate Confucianism by translating it into the language of Kant yield 
convincing results. All the more, the same is true for Mou’s ambition to elevate 
 Confucian moral practice to the status of a Kant-inspired “Perfect Good” (summum 
bonum), which is supposed ultimately to reconcile the theory and practice of phi-
losophy. Both its inscrutable content and its invulnerable form thus shield Mou’s 
philosophy against common forms of criticism. Inexpressible in propositional lan-
guage, its truth is no more a function of what it says but of who says it: construed in 
a way that defies rational argument, moral metaphysics eventually has to appeal to 
belief. And as its plausibility escapes rational verification, it invokes the authority of 
its enunciator: the teacher of the Confucian Way. I therefore conclude that Mou’s 
philosophy can be read as a philosophical rehabilitation of the traditional idea of a 
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“continuity of the Way” (daotong 道統), a belief held by imperial Confucians that the 
correct Way is transmitted from an authoritative teacher to his disciple.4
A discussion of Mou Zongsan’s philosophy requires a short remark on some of 
the peculiarities of his writings. Mou’s philosophy joins traditions as alien to each 
other as Kantian transcendentalism, the inclusivist classification of doctrines devel-
oped in Tiantai Buddhism, and a specific idea of the transmission of the Confucian 
Way, to name but a few of its most important ingredients. Not only does he frankly 
combine terms stemming from these extremely different contexts; sometimes he even 
goes so far as simply to identify them — even if, at times, he may signal that judging 
from their respective perspectives such a step may appear inadmissible.5 Mou’s ten-
dency to refer to a broad variety of different sources and divergent uses of terms 
poses particular challenges to any translator, even to any reader, of his works.6 Yet, 
although I readily admit that particular translational choices may be suggestive in the 
sense of favoring one interpretation over another, I am firmly convinced that the 
problems we encounter in reading Mou are caused not exclusively, not even mainly, 
by our inadequate translations of particular terms.
Mou’s Claim on Kantian Autonomy and Its Consequences for 
Confucian Doxography
Mou’s moral metaphysics owes much to his encounter with Kant’s thought, in terms 
of both its Kantian vocabulary and its understanding of what is the highest aim of 
philosophy — namely the reconciliation of theoretical and practical reason.
One of Mou’s most renowned students, Lee Ming-huei, highlights the tremen-
dous role of Kantianism for Mou’s interpretation of Confucianism revolving around a 
Kant-inspired notion of “autonomy.”7 According to Lee, Mou recognizes in the Men-
cian “heart” or “mind” (xin) the “philosophical-anthropological” framework of moral 
autonomy, as, still in Lee’s presentation, this “heart” combines an a priori universal-
ism with the unity of both the rational and the emotional.8 Considering Lee’s sum-
mary of the core of Mou’s moral philosophy, insightful and correct in our view, 
we notice that Mou agrees with the conventions of imperial Neo-Confucianism9 
when he places the moral judgment of the Mencian “heart” at the core of his teach-
ing. His innovation lies in his interpretation of this “heart” in terms of the philosoph-
ical notion of autonomy, a move with substantial and far-reaching consequences for 
evaluating the correct line of transmission of the Way.
In his endeavor to make Mou’s thought accessible to a non-Chinese public — the 
passage referred to here is taken from a textbook in German — Lee Ming-huei trans-
lates its pivotal point into a familiar “Western” philosophical vocabulary: the Men-
cian “heart” here turns straightaway into the Kantian “moral subject,” while the 
Confucian “moral principle” (li 理) is paraphrased by the Kantian expression of the 
“moral law.” This equalization of terms allows Lee, certainly in line with his teacher’s 
intention, to recast the famous phrase “xin ji li” 心即理 by the Song Confucian Lu 
Jiuyuan 陸九淵 (Xiangshan 象山) (1139–1193) in terms of eighteenth-century Euro-
pean moral philosophy, rendering it as “a unity of the moral subject and the moral 
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law.”10 In the light of this interpretation of the Mencian “heart,” Lu Xiangshan’s  motto 
suddenly appears as a claim of the moral autonomy of the subject: the “principle” 
to be found inside his or her genuine heart or mind is the moral law. If the principles 
of moral action do not exclusively arise from our moral consciousness, or — in Lee’s 
much more suggestive Kantian paraphrase — if moral law does not arise from the 
moral subject, then this implies an outright heteronomy.11 Precisely this flaw in Mou’s 
view afflicts the competing “orthodox” school of Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107) and 
Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200), which rejects the idea that our moral consciousness di-
rectly discovers these “principles” within itself, and instead argues that it only detects 
them in our engagement with the external world.12 Mou’s application of the Kantian 
notion of autonomy to the Mencian “heart,” however problematic and controver-
sial13 in itself, elevates moral autonomy to the essence of the teaching of Confucius 
and the touchstone of its correct transmission. He provides what appears to be a 
philosophical criterion for reconstructing a doctrinal continuity.14
This spelling-out of Mencian anthropology with the vocabulary of Kant proves 
double-edged. Glossing Confucian terms with Kantian concepts, Mou weaves a del-
icate texture of mutual correspondences and equivalences imbuing Kantian terms 
with a Confucian aura and vesting Kantian distinctions into the linguistic garment of 
Neo-Confucianism. However, renouncing comment on this process and its conse-
quences, Mou leaves the intricate philosophical problems of such an equalization of 
Confucian and Kantian terms largely unaddressed.15 As he leaves implicit the exact 
relationship between the two conceptual worlds, his hybrid Confucian-Kantian ter-
minology inherits a significant lack of definition. The resulting ambiguity doubtless is 
calculated, as it is indispensable for Mou’s erection of his lofty conceptual construc-
tions. Yet, in the attempt to naturalize Kantian “moral autonomy” to Mencianism, this 
procedure patently fails. Mou here unwittingly thwarts the very property for which he 
holds Kantianism in so high esteem: in the process of its appropriation, “moral auton-
omy” loses both the a prioricity and universal validity of its Kantian model.16
Mou’s notion of “intellectual intuition” is designed precisely to warrant our in-
sight into this moral autonomy.17 However, allegedly a practical experience of the 
lived body, intellectual intuition is said to escape conceptual thought and proposi-
tional language. It can only be alluded to in the metaphorizing rhetoric of paradox. 
Mou’s approach, therefore, renders his talk on autonomy ultimately inscrutable, at 
least conceptually.18 The philosophical rampart he erects hermeticizes and mystifies 
his thought and eventually undermines its ability to speak in its own right. It is pre-
cisely this internalization and resulting incommunicability of moral autonomy that 
paves the way to the restoration of the daotong. The need to invoke the authority of 
the sage hence clearly responds to exigencies systematically brought about by the 
alleged content and particular design of Mou’s philosophy.
Paradoxically — though possibly not inadvertently — Mou’s strategy to recast the 
Confucian tradition in terms of critical philosophy results in its immunization against 
any familiar forms of criticism: whatever Mou finds with Kantian philosophy, it is 
quite obvious that it is not its universal call for critical evaluation that attracts him. In 
contrast to others,19 I do not think that Mou failed to grasp the essentials of Kantian 
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critique. I simply think that it just might have been a different aspect of Kantianism 
that aroused Mou’s interest: the promise that it restrains the pretensions of theoreti-
cal reason and hence determines the limits of objective knowledge all by “making 
room for faith.”20 While Mou appreciated Kant’s primacy of practical over theoretical 
reason, he simply refused to accept that critique cannot allow for any refuges inac-
cessible to its universal call for rational justification, and that providing such resorts 
undermines the very basis of the critical project.
Intellectual Intuition and Moral Practice
In Mou’s view, pre-modern Confucians in their engagement in moral cultivation have 
actually experienced in their very practice an awareness of the “moral norm” (li 理) 
imparted to them by their human nature.21 Their documents therefore bear witness to 
the truth that human beings indeed can have an intuitive insight into the fundamental 
reality of their moral autonomy — or, in Mou’s terms, humans can have “intellectual 
intuition.”22 However, Mou is aware that the mere appeal to the authority of tradi-
tional writings along with his claim that these are to be read as documenting “intel-
lectual intuition” are hardly convincing for those who either do not blindfoldedly 
accept tradition’s authority or doubt that Mou’s resort to this notion is an appropriate 
approach to these texts. He therefore sees the duty to substantiate his core claim that 
humans can have intellectual intuition, a task he has to fulfill on two different levels: 
that it is necessary for humans to be capable of intellectual intuition has to be estab-
lished both in theoretical23 and in practical24 respects.
Stipulating the Theoretical Necessity of Intellectual Intuition
At the beginning of his discussion of moral intuition, Mou invokes the language of 
Kantianism to define morality as “acting according to the unconditional categorical 
imperative.”25 This categorical imperative, according to Kant, is emitted by our free 
will, a concept that Mou glosses with a number of Confucian terms like “genuine 
heart” (benxin 本心), “essential humanity” (renti 仁體), and “genuine knowledge” 
(liangzhi).26 He holds that all these various expressions coincide in pointing to the 
“transcendental foundation of moral action,” which constitutes the “nature” (xing) of 
the human being.27 In an attempt to explain why the categorical imperative arises 
from free will, Mou writes that “only if it is like this, its [= of the free will] imperative 
becomes something unconditioned and categorical. And this is what Confucians 
designate as that which essential substance commands (xingti zhi suo ming 性體之
所命).”28
Mou, eventually replacing the Kantian term of the free will by its alleged Confu-
cian equivalent, goes on to state that “if essential substance were a limited concept, 
it would be impossible that the imperative that it [= essential substance] emits would 
not be [somehow] restricted.”29 Mou here appeals to Kant’s notion of categoricity,30 
which excludes calling categorical an imperative emitted by something that is itself 
conditioned. It is essential to the action commanded by the categorical imperative 
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that it is executed exclusively because it is good. Would it be conditioned, it would 
depend on causes other than its being good. For Mou, the possibility of a categori-
cal imperative hence requires the possibility of an unconditioned Good. Without 
the categorical imperative, the unconditioned Good with its various designations 
(“nature,” “essential substance,” “free will,” “moral law”) would forfeit its potential 
to guide our actions. Genuinely good actions would prove impossible. Therefore, the 
categorical imperative is a viable concept only if acting good is really possible. And 
if good actions can actually be realized, then the unconditioned Good as their exclu-
sive source must be real, too.
Under its functional aspect as the “transcendental foundation” of our human 
nature, Mou calls this unconditioned and hence absolute Good by names like 
 “nature” (xing) and “essential substance” (xingti). When viewed from the normative 
perspective of determining our actions, he identifies it with the moral law — which, 
we remember, he equalizes to the Confucian “moral principle” (li). If, thus, the un-
conditioned foundation would be impossible, the “autonomy”31 of the moral law 
would be mere illusion.32 Mou, aware that something unconditioned or absolute 
cannot be grasped in what Kant calls discursive language, considers the reality of the 
moral action as proof to the reality of this absolute: intellectual intuition, the treasure 
of the Confucian tradition, in this view, is the key disclosing to us what we cannot 
recognize in conceptual terms. Our personal awareness, at some point, of really 
acting morally testifies to the actual reality of the unconditioned Good.
That the absolute Good can be witnessed through one’s moral actions is thus 
precisely what the Confucian tradition of the “learning of the heart” is thought to 
warrant. It is from the vantage point of moral autonomy that the theoretical necessity 
that Mou invokes arises: assuming that the categorical imperative indeed has any 
bearing on our concrete actions presupposes the reality of its unconditioned source. 
This reality, however, cannot be conceived as the existence of an object that causes 
good action, as such an integration of the unconditioned Good into the realm of 
natural causality would presuppose its undue reification. It is precisely for this reason 
that it cannot be recognized theoretically, but only experienced practically. How-
ever, this practical experience is nothing else than the concrete action prompted by 
the categorical imperative. If this latter is to be a reality — and Mou is convinced that 
it is — one has to be able to recognize that a particular action is indeed triggered by 
it. And as the reality of this good action by the very concept of categoricity could not 
be caused by anything else than an unconditioned Good, this latter appears as a 
theoretical necessity. If the concept of categoricity therefore is to be more than mere 
figurative speech, what cannot be recognized theoretically still has to be assumed on 
theoretical grounds.
The essential character of the categorical imperative, presupposing the uncondi-
tioned Good that emits it, can only be disclosed to us in intellectual intuition, our 
spontaneous awareness in acting that what we are doing indeed is good. For this 
reason, intellectual intuition precisely by allowing us to capture the goodness of our 
actions equally testifies to the reality of the absolute Good. On theoretical grounds 
the “verification” of the reality of the categorical imperative, not recognizable 
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 theoretically, must be grasped in another way. And this way is our practical experi-
ence in actu of the good disclosed by intellectual intuition. The reality of morality 
amounts to the reality of the categorical imperative, and the reality of the categorical 
imperative presupposes intellectual intuition as our only possible means to verify it.
Anchoring autonomy in moral feeling, which seems to appear to him as the 
rock-solid ground of one of the most basic human experiences, instead of conceiving 
it in terms of what he considers mere conceptual speculation ultimately detached 
from the concrete reality of human life, Mou in a way suggests to place Kant back on 
his feet. Yet, even if we can reconstruct Mou’s argument it becomes clear that his 
understanding of “moral autonomy” fundamentally departs from Kant,33 for whom 
pure reason implies the necessary idea of a “causa noumenon,” an unconditioned 
cause. Yet, as ideas of reason cannot find any evidence in objective knowledge, 
which relies on understanding and sensible intuition, they can only be of a regulative 
use. Pure reason is the “ratio cognoscendi” of the free will: reason makes available, 
in fact even requires, the thought of a first cause. At the same time, however, it makes 
it clear that there is no way of objectively recognizing such a cause. Nonetheless it 
obliges the empirical subject, which recognizes itself as a natural and hence heter-
onomously conditioned being, to think of free will as a causa noumenon of its ac-
tions, as by virtue of being a rational being it has the duty to act in accordance with 
reason. Without delving into the odds and ends of Kantian critique, we can recog-
nize that Mou’s concern to anchor the reality of the free will in an existential sense 
is entirely alien to Kant’s notion of the free will.34
Even more problematic is Mou’s attempt to achieve this goal by claiming the 
possibility of intellectual intuition. Unlike Mou’s insinuation, Kant’s reason for hold-
ing that humans lack it most definitely is not that the Christian tradition of an anthro-
pomorphic God hindered him from doing so. Kant’s God is an ideal resulting from 
one of the ideas of pure reason, one of the notions of totality required by reason’s 
inherent structure; and it is, at the same time, a postulate of practical reason.35 Thus, 
there is no claim that God exists. Kant’s position rather comes down to not much 
more than the requirement that we act as if God existed. It is essential to the Kantian 
critique that the realms of nature and morality are heterogeneous and that we can-
not know about a real unity of both in the sense of the transcendental foundation 
allegedly provided by what Mou terms our moral “nature” (xing) or “essential sub-
stance” (xingti).36
The Practical Necessity of Intellectual Intuition
In his motivation of a practical necessity of intellectual intuition, Mou entirely leaves 
the confines of Kantianism. Trying to provide what he calls a “positive” notion of in-
tellectual intuition, he presents three different aspects of it: the first pertains to its 
experience from the perspective of the empirical, that is, “unenlightened” subject;37 
the second refers to its being witnessed, in moral acting, from within;38 and the third 
eventually relates to its cosmological dimension.39
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At one point, Mou compares the first aspect of intellectual intuition to a light 
projected into our limited human lives by the unlimited heart40 — arising as what we 
experience as a moral feeling, it urges us to action. As it often pushes against our 
habits and routines, we tend to experience it as untimely, and we may even feel ex-
tremely reluctant to follow its guidance. Directing our attention to the distress and 
need for help of the people next to us, it is also a bitter experience bringing to our 
consciousness the suffering of the world. What is more, the lucid moments of moral 
clarity flashing up in intellectual intuition pass by. There may well be a theoretically 
infinite approximation to the absolute moral heart that is the source of that light. The 
source itself, however, remains out of reach. In approximating the unlimited heart, 
we are said to progress in leaps, from one moment of illumination to the next. In this 
process we thus reach what Mou terms ever higher degrees of “intensity” (qiangdu 
強­度) of moral alertness.
The second aspect of intellectual intuition refers to the very moment of our 
 enactment of the moral law. Here, the sorrow and distress of ourselves and our 
 neighbor give way to the experience of happiness brought along by the certainty of 
partaking in realizing what is right and good. For a moment, the cleavages and con-
flicts characterizing our daily environment are suspended. Mou characterizes this 
intellectual intuition “from within” as a “qualitative” experience of the infinite heart, 
which he terms “subjective.” During this innermost experience of moral acting, the 
unlimited heart can indeed be realized in its genuine significance.41
The third aspect of intellectual intuition eventually purports that our moral deeds 
do in fact improve the world, that they possess a creative power that changes the real 
world of our everyday lives. It guarantees that the sphere of moral practice witnessed 
in intellectual intuition is indeed connected to the natural world of physical objects.
Although Mou quite consistently sticks to this tripartite schema throughout his 
discussion of intellectual intuition, he does not actually fill this notion with the posi-
tive content he so often boasts. Mou tells us something about the place of intel-
lectual intuition in moral self-cultivation and about the problems of moral agency. 
But out of all things the purported content of intellectual intuition, the specific values 
it allegedly discloses, remains sealed off in the externally inscrutable confines of 
 introspection.
Intellectual Intuition and Moral Cultivation
Independently of these difficulties in coming to terms with the specificities of Mou’s 
notion of intellectual intuition, it is clear that he assigns it the crucial role in moral 
self-cultivation. As Mou presents the matter, accessing the genuine heart in flashes of 
intellectual intuition has a reinforcing effect on our moral improvement. Mou main-
tains that experiencing moments of intellectual intuition makes us more and more 
responsive to our moral feeling, turning us into ever more efficient agents of free 
will.42 What he does not give is an account of how we are able to recognize that, at 
a certain point, we can be sure that we are indeed intellectually intuiting.
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Fortunately, however, Mou provides a concrete example of how he thinks single 
moral actions are prompted by the genuine heart:
Moral action coincides with the manifold (zaduo 雜多) [of experience], and self-activity 
(ziwo huodong 自我活動) coincides with the activity of the lucid awareness (mingjue 
明­覺) of moral nature.43 Here, the activity of lucid awareness . . . is one’s reflexive aware-
ness (nijue 逆覺) that its [= the substantial humaneness of the genuine heart] command 
urges one to realize without fail (bu rongyi de 不容已的) various kinds of actions (xingshi 
行事).44
In this passage, Mou determines “intellectual intuition” not as an awareness that 
there is such a substantial humanity, but rather as an actual awareness in the very 
moment of acting that right now one is unconditionally prompted to do so by this 
substantial humanity. The phrase captures the experience of being inevitably urged 
to action in an awareness that acting so is good. It is what Mou elsewhere determines 
as “genuine” (zhenzheng de 真正的) intellectual intuition45 and what corresponds to 
the second aspect discussed above.
When Mou illustrates how the genuine heart drives the individual agent to moral 
action, his examples show the serious difficulties of his conception of intellectual 
intuition. In a comment on an interpretation of the Mencian “genuine knowledge” 
(liangzhi) by Wang Yangming46 Mou writes:
Seeing one’s father, one spontaneously knows about filial piety; in view of one’s elder 
brother, one spontaneously knows about one’s respect toward his older brother; coming 
across an unbearable situation, one simply acts, as one cannot bear it; in a shameful sit-
uation, one cannot but feel ashamed. All these are virtuous actions (dexing 德行) [sic! ]. 
In all these cases one obeys the command of the genuine heart’s substantial humaneness, 
and each time these actions are but free spontaneity of the substance of moral nature. 
Seeing one’s father, one shows piety in one’s conduct. This is then an action. “Sponta-
neously to know filial piety” simply means that from the lucid awareness of the genuine 
heart of substantial humaneness one spontaneously knows that one has to act in a filial 
manner. In this, the genuine heart emits the imperative that one “needs to be filial.” . . . 
To know filial piety is to be filial. . . . All this is the spontaneous freedom of the substance 
of moral nature. This free emission of an imperative by substantial moral nature at the 
same time spontaneously manifests itself in different actions (xingshi 行事). It is not a void 
(kongxuan 空懸) imperative.47
This illustration of Mou’s free will at work confirms our suspicion that his “sub-
stantiation” of the “categorical imperative” is at odds with Kant’s respective concept. 
It seems that he pays a heavy price for this adaptation of the original notion. It may 
well help him to envision a possibility of conceiving of values as being sponta neously 
disclosed to us in a kind of self-implementing moral behavior. His concluding re-
marks on the “void” character of Kant’s categorical imperative show that he does not 
appreciate the value of its merely formal character. An ethics based on mutually 
non-contradictory maxims precisely due to its purely formal design allows individual 
subjects to formulate their own preferences, all by preserving an overarching princi-
ple restricting their freedom and preventing it from turning into arbitrariness. And it 
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keeps room for the individual subjects to decide on ethical issues. In contrast, free-
dom in Mou’s sense is but self-causation. For the empirical subject, this freedom is 
only available if it is absorbed in the moral substance of the universe. In moral action, 
the agency of the empirical individual entirely disappears. Moral acts as conceived 
by Mou in the passage above are quasi-automatically instantiated by a force that is 
alien to the non-enlightened empirical subject. In a way Mou may thus succeed in 
saving the idea of substantial values and the traditional morals that propagate them, 
but he does so at the expense of any viable concept of genuine ethical choice.
For Mou, the empirical self is the effect of a reductionist self-conception.48 In 
order to be free it has to sacrifice the illusion of essentially being an individual entity 
opposed to others and to coalesce with actual substance, which by its very sponta-
neity is free and self-caused. The spontaneous moral act unmasks the reductionist 
nature of one’s empirical self-conception as an individualized self and unveils an 
awareness of partaking in a moral activity that transcends the allegedly self-imposed 
and artificial borders of the self. This kind of pure activity is what remains of reality if 
it is experienced in a way that suspends all the dismembering effects of the differen-
tiating modes of cognition — it is the substantial and essential unity of everything, a 
unity that according to Mou can only be experienced in the actuality of the moral 
act.49
Summarizing what has so far been said on the ability of human beings to expe-
rience intellectual intuition, we can basically distinguish two different modes of how 
the empirical self is said to be able to access substantial humanity. First, substance 
can be witnessed in a mode of reflexive awareness (nijue). Second, it can impose 
 itself on the empirical self as a categorical imperative when realizing itself in sponta-
neous moral activity. Both are interrelated in that Mou holds that the power of 
substance to realize itself in a person’s moral activity increases, as his or her experi-
ences of witnessing substance in reflexive awareness multiply. Mou thus presents 
a doctrine of Confucian self-cultivation partly redressed in the guise of a Kantian 
 vocabulary.50
We conclude that occasional contentions51 that Mou develops his claim for the 
necessity of intellectual intuition from inside a Kantian framework are untenable.52 
Quite to the contrary, Mou’s criticism, rather than accrediting the essential concep-
tual framework of Kant’s approach, involves a downright conflation of a number 
of distinctions essential to appreciating Kant’s argument.53 Most alarming to Mou 
should be that by his “substantialization” of the “transcendental” foundation of mo-
rality he — possibly unwittingly — tears down the only formally warranted universal 
and unconditional character of moral autonomy, doubtless one of his most cherished 
aspects of Kant’s system. As that foundation becomes a matter of belief rather than 
rational argument, Mou unwittingly is trapped back in dogmatism.
Gestures of Authority: Transmitting the Incommunicable
Mou’s case is probably less unfavorable with his arguments for the practical neces sity 
of intellectual intuition. It has emerged from the preceding discussion that what Mou 
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appeals to by this notion is nothing else than the crucial role of moral feeling for 
acting good. In this he seems to address a genuine problem of Kantianism, one that 
is comprehensible even without Mou’s metaphysical presuppositions: how is genu-
inely moral, that is, autonomous, action possible if, by our very nature as empirical 
beings, we are inevitably heteronomously determined? In addressing the problem of 
the moral feeling in Kant’s work as a crucial issue, Lee Ming-huei has thus plausibly 
identified an aspect of Mou’s moral metaphysics that may provide a possible vantage 
point for a Confucian criticism of Kantian ethics, a concern, Lee emphasizes, shared 
by the “majority” of German ethicians after Kant.54 However, granting this point does 
not affect our observation that Mou’s talk on intellectual intuition is marked by a 
flamboyant lack of content, which, in the worst case, might be interpreted in terms of 
a strategy to protect traditional values from being critically challenged.
Possibly the most vexing consequence of Mou’s interpretation of the moral feel-
ing as intellectual intuition, however, seems to be that the empirical subject — and 
hence what carries, in his view, the entire apparatus of cognitive representation — is 
in a sense suspended in moral acting. The empirical subject, thus “turning” into a 
moral agent, may well intuitively know that what he or she is doing is good. But at 
the same time, he or she loses the possibility of understanding it: if Mou is right, the 
content of moral consciousness simply evades propositional language and concep-
tual thought.55
Mou’s emphasis on the moral feeling reflects a complete internalization not only 
of our awareness of morality but also of the criteria for whether a particular act can 
count as good. This leaves moral values and evaluations essentially incommunicable. 
They prove to be neither verbalizable nor criticizable.56 As we announced at the 
beginning, Mou’s intellectual intuition hence places the centerpiece of his moral 
philosophy, the genuine heart and the essential values that it implies, into a space 
beyond the linguistic, cognitive, and conceptual reach of the empirical subject. Intel-
lectual intuition and what it unveils become something entirely esoteric and can only 
be shared with the outsider by means of testimony or confession.
Bereft of any means to actually understand, let alone critically verify, what the 
insider, the Confucian, is telling him, the validity of the testimony for the outsider 
moves from the content of the claim to the person uttering it. In this way, intellectual 
intuition is pivotal for restoring the authority of the teacher and of the traditional in-
terpretation of the continuity of the Way.
What is more, only if we assume that the Confucian teacher knows in a funda-
mentally different way than we do — not only about himself but also about his 
 counterpart — and that his student, too, has the ability to access this different way of 
knowing, can we conceive of a viable concept of the transmission of the Way: the 
first condition warrants that the teacher is in possession of a criterion not only for 
deciding whether he himself is actually intellectually intuiting, but also for judging if 
his vis-à-vis, too, is partaking in this experience of intellectual intuition. The second 
one guarantees that the student is in a position to understand what his teacher means 
when he accords to him the ability to engage correctly in intellectual intuition. Al-
though we have to suspect such a way of communication, we must at the same time 
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accept that it has to remain unintelligible for us as long as we do not have intellec-
tual intuition ourselves. As outsiders we either simply believe that there is some-
thing essential in talking about intellectual intuition and its transmission, or we refuse 
to accept this kind of arcane communication, which necessarily remains senseless 
for us.
Or, to adopt a remark by Schopenhauer on Schelling’s philosophy of identity: for 
those who lack intellectual intuition all expositions about it “must remain as a book 
sealed with seven seals.”57
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knowledge. As Mou puts it, “the lucid awareness” of “substantial knowledge 
(zhiti 知體)” “has consciously to negate itself . . . and to turn into understanding 
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same time, a “genuine” unlimited self — a self able to conceive of his or her 
actions as transcending these narrow limits and the motives hinging on them — 
might be interpreted as conducive to a moral practice of self-cultivation. See 
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50   –   Mou, Zhi de zhijue yu Zhongguo zhexue, p. 198.
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 occur in a state of impurity. But that the substantial heart becomes aware on a 
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particular occasion does not mean that reflexive awareness is sensible. “The 
occasion that becomes a restriction” of the fundamental heart, e.g., a toddler’s 
falling into a well, “is sensible,” but it is provoked by the “lucid awareness” 
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coincides with its total manifestation, and that progressive and immediate realization 
are no more opposed to each other. (Mou, Xianxiang yu wuzishen, p. 82)
This shows that Mou imagines “moral knowledge” as employing “empirical 
knowledge” as an instrument, the latter being the means by which moral knowl-
edge realizes itself. This means that one can well describe what happens in a 
moral act: one can name the persons involved, describe their interaction, and 
so on. However, this level entirely belongs to the understanding and its analyt-
ical language. Insofar as they are moral, insofar as they are caused by the sub-
stantial heart, however, one only can know about these actions through 
intellectual intuition, and there is no apt language for directly referring to this 
level of reality.
56   –   The Chuanxilu records a dialogue between Wang Yangming and Xue Kan that 
nicely illustrates this problem. Xue desperately asks for criteria to decide 
 whether some action is good or bad. Wang, unable to provide such a criterion, 
eventually relegates him to asking his own heart or conscience. This speechless-
ness of the teacher with regard to the guiding moral principle also shows the 
danger of anomy lingering in this kind of internalization of moral judgments. 
For a translation see Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, pp. 63–65.
57   –   Arthur, Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, Book I, trans. R. B. Haldane 
and J. Kemp (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., 1909), pp. 32–33.
